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Advanced Population Health Surveillance Through Epidemiological Investigation and Medical Laboratory Diagnostics: Integrating Disease Pattern Analysis, Laboratory-Based Detection, and Early Identification of Public Health Risks.

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Abstract

Background: Surveillance teams use laboratory results to detect health threats, but changes in testing and reporting can also produce apparent changes in disease frequency. This review examines how epidemiological investigation and laboratory diagnostics can distinguish these explanations and guide early action. Methods: Targeted searches identified PubMed-indexed surveillance evaluations, outbreak investigations, methods studies, and evidence syntheses available through November 16, 2026. Evidence was interpreted by setting, sampling design, comparator, and outcome. Results: Linked case and laboratory records can distinguish new episodes from repeat tests and help identify whether test volume or assay changes contributed to a signal. Electronic reporting can accelerate notification, although completeness depends on validated coding and clinical linkage. Sequencing can help resolve clusters when interpreted alongside exposure data. Wastewater can detect circulation outside clinical sampling, but its lead time varies by pathogen, catchment, and reporting comparator. Routine antimicrobial susceptibility data are useful for monitoring resistance among tested isolates; selective culturing limits inference about population burden. Investigations tied to Saudi healthcare facilities and pilgrimage illustrate the value of integrating exposure histories, timelines, and laboratory findings. Conclusion: Early warning is most useful when laboratories and epidemiologists agree on what is counted, preserve the information needed to verify alerts, and measure the time from signal to action.

Keywords: public health surveillance; epidemiology; laboratory diagnostics; outbreak detection; genomic surveillance; antimicrobial resistance

1. Introduction

A rise in laboratory-confirmed cases may reflect an outbreak, a change in who is tested, or a shorter delay before reports reach public health authorities. Each infection must pass through several steps before it is counted: recognition of illness, access to care, specimen collection, testing, and reporting. Losses at each step help explain why reported incidence can differ from disease burden. Strong surveillance systems make these

losses visible enough for investigators to judge whether a signal reflects transmission or a change in ascertainment. [1, 2]

Laboratories define what a test detected and under what conditions. Epidemiologists link that observation to a case definition, a time and place, and a population at risk. This distinction matters when diagnostic methods change. Foodborne surveillance, for example, has recorded shifts in the case mix as molecular testing has expanded even when overall reported incidence of a pathogen was stable. This review examines how the two disciplines can combine their data to interpret disease patterns, verify early signals, and choose measures that reflect how quickly an investigation leads to action. [3, 4]

2. Methods

Targeted literature searches on November 16, 2026, used terms for population health surveillance, outbreak detection, laboratory reporting, diagnostic ascertainment, genomic epidemiology, wastewater, antimicrobial resistance, and investigations linked to Saudi Arabia. English-language publications on human infectious disease and resistance surveillance were eligible. Selection favored comparative evaluations, primary outbreak investigations, methods studies with validation, and major evidence syntheses; relevant foundational methods were retained regardless of year. Bibliographic details were checked against PubMed records and, where needed, the journal sites.

Findings were interpreted according to who or what was sampled, the time anchor used for comparison, the event being detected, and whether the study observed outcomes or modeled them. This was a critical narrative review. It did not conduct exhaustive screening, a formal risk-of-bias assessment, or a new meta-analysis. It uses published evidence and contains no original patient or laboratory data.

3. Results

3.1 Interpreting Disease Patterns

Counts of specimens, reports, and affected people answer different questions. A patient may be tested more than once, and one specimen may generate preliminary, final, and corrected results. Surveillance should retain these updates for audit while counting unique episodes under a versioned case definition. A case series should identify the denominator, if known, and distinguish symptom onset, specimen collection, result authorization, and receipt by public health. When onset is missing, a series based on specimen dates should say so. Conditions that permit probable cases should report them separately from confirmed cases or make changes in classification traceable. [1, 2, 5]

Linking clinical and laboratory records allows teams to compare newly classified cases with the volume and results of testing. A rise in positive results while test positivity is stable may be driven by increased testing, but a change in whom clinicians test can obscure a true rise. Investigators should compare like groups, including diagnostic and screening indications, and assess geographic or age differences in coverage. When only positive results are reported, calculating positivity requires a separate count of those tested. [3, 4, 6] Figure 1 shows how linked records support separate analyses of disease episodes and testing activity.




Figure 1. Linking clinical notifications and laboratory results.

Two linked series separate disease episodes from testing activity. Denominator data must cover the same population, setting, and period as the results. [1, 3, 6]

Emergency department syndromic surveillance can flag a rise in compatible presentations before etiology is available. Its interpretation depends on care seeking, coding practices, and the total encounter volume. Event-based surveillance adds reports of unusual occurrences from clinicians, communities, or other channels. Such reports can prompt verification even when case counts are too small for a stable statistical baseline. Differences in coverage mean that a quiet surveillance stream cannot by itself rule out an outbreak. [7-9]

Time series methods such as the improved Farrington approach compare observed counts with a historical baseline that accounts for predictable variation. Performance depends on seasonality, sparse counts, and disturbances in the baseline; simulation studies do not identify a single best method for all settings. Validation should replay only the data available at each decision time and include outages and changes in testing. If the newest weeks are incomplete, nowcasting can estimate cases not yet reported from the delay distribution. Its uncertainty should be shown, particularly when the backlog or delay pattern is changing. A statistical alert is a reason to investigate; it is not confirmation of an outbreak. [10-13]

3.2 Diagnostic Testing and Reporting Quality

Preanalytic information is part of the surveillance result. Collection timing, specimen type, transport, prior therapy, and sampling strategy may alter detection. Early data on severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) showed that the probability of a negative molecular result in infected people varied with timing. A rejected specimen or inconclusive result should remain identifiable rather than be coded as negative. Positive results should be classified under the relevant case definition, using clinical and exposure information where required. [1, 14]

Culture-independent diagnostic tests can detect infections missed by conventional culture and change the types of cases reported. In the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, trends estimated from culture-confirmed salmonellosis differed from those based on all reported infections. Reflex culture after selected positive molecular results can recover isolates for typing and susceptibility testing. Availability of an isolate depends on whether culture was attempted and succeeded. Tracking both steps by site and period helps teams interpret which cases enter genomic or resistance analyses. [3, 4, 15]

Electronic laboratory reporting can reduce manual delay and increase capture. A feed should be tested end to end, including local code mappings, specimen and organism fields, amendments, duplicates, and the time at which a result becomes available to the receiving team. High-volume code coverage alone does not guarantee that rare reportable results are captured. Test messages for rare or inconclusive results and amended reports can reveal whether records reach the intended queue and replace earlier values correctly. Clinical case reporting can add information absent from laboratory records, such as symptoms, exposures, or demographic

fields. Comparative evaluations show that gains in completeness and timeliness differ across settings; receiving teams should audit both before combining data streams. [5, 6, 16, 17]

3.3 Complementary Surveillance Methods

Whole-genome sequencing improves discrimination among isolates. The United States listeriosis program identified and solved more outbreaks after sequencing was combined with epidemiological investigation and food traceback. Canadian experience showed that changes in cluster and outbreak detection differed by pathogen, even within one national transition. A close sequence match can justify re-interviewing cases or reviewing common exposures, but genetic distance alone cannot establish a shared source or the direction of transmission. The organism, laboratory pipeline, background diversity, and sampling interval affect the interpretation. [18-21]

In hospitals, combining sequence information with ward timelines can reveal links that routine surveillance missed. Use of clinical isolates alone, however, leaves gaps where colonized patients, unsampled infections, and environmental sources are not represented. An evaluation of real-time sequencing with infection prevention interventions demonstrated operational feasibility in one hospital; reductions in infections and costs were modeled rather than measured against a concurrent control. Local adoption should therefore monitor the proportion of eligible isolates sequenced, time to a usable result, and the fraction of clusters with corroborating epidemiological links. [22, 23]

Measurements of viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) in wastewater can reveal trends in contributing communities without relying on individual care seeking. The apparent lead depends on whether the comparison starts at clinical specimen collection, result reporting, or hospitalization. California data for influenza A and respiratory syncytial virus showed positive correlations with clinical measures, without a consistent lead across sites. Repeated genetically linked poliovirus detections in London sewage illustrate a different use: environmental evidence can prompt investigation and response even when clinical ascertainment is limited. Interpretation requires information about the contributing catchment, sample recovery, and temporal variation. Communities outside the sewer network require other surveillance routes. [24-28]

Antimicrobial resistance surveillance should state which patients are cultured, how repeat isolates are handled, what specimen types are included, and which interpretive breakpoints were used. A resistance percentage among tested isolates differs from an incidence rate of resistant infection in a defined population. Selective blood culturing and prior antibiotic exposure can shift both estimates. A regional assessment of the Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System highlighted variation in representativeness, laboratory quality, and how quickly data could support local decisions. Blood donor serosurveys provide another sentinel source: repeated sampling can describe trends in eligible donors, but weighting cannot remove all selection due to donor eligibility or behavior. Table 1 summarizes what each stream measures and the main check before using it to infer risk. [29-33]

Table 1. Surveillance streams and their interpretation

Data stream	Unit or denominator	Check before acting
Clinical notification	Unique episodes meeting a case definition	Keep probable and confirmed cases distinguishable; examine coverage. [1]
Emergency department syndromic data	Syndrome encounters among all eligible encounters	Review coding and visit volume; verify cause with other data. [8]
Diagnostic laboratory results	People or episodes tested, if available	Compare test types and indications; exclude duplicate reports. [3, 6]
Genomic clusters	Usable sequences among eligible isolates	Confirm sampling coverage and investigate plausible links. [20, 21]
Wastewater	Samples over time from a defined catchment	Check recovery and catchment changes; compare with clinical trends. [25, 28]
Resistance surveillance	Isolates of the same organism tested for a given drug	Review sampling intensity, repeat isolates, and breakpoints. [29, 30]

3.4 Alert Verification and Public Health Response

On receiving an alert, laboratory staff can check assay changes, specimen quality, coding, and delayed or duplicate reports. Epidemiologists can compare the signal with the expected pattern, review cases by onset and exposure, and seek independent evidence from interviews, clinical reports, or another site. The two checks should proceed in parallel when delay could matter. [1, 9]

Figure 2 shows how those checks inform a response. For events with serious potential consequences, teams should follow local notification procedures while verification continues. Document the decision and communicate it to reporting sites. [34]




Figure 2. From early alert to public health action.

Laboratory and epidemiological checks inform the same risk decision. High-consequence events may require immediate notification while verification proceeds under local procedures. [1, 9, 34]

Saudi investigations show what this collaboration can add. During the 2014 Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus outbreak in Jeddah, case interviews and record review identified frequent healthcare-related contacts. Interviews also elicited symptoms in 26 of 33 people initially listed as asymptomatic who were reached, showing how incomplete clinical histories can affect case classification. Laboratory proficiency testing and viral sequence analysis helped assess alternative explanations for the increase and supported healthcare-associated spread. Invasive meningococcal disease associated with Umrah travel was later identified across countries. Travel dates, household contacts, serogrouping, and sequence data helped distinguish related travel-associated cases from wider circulation of several sublineages. The reports cover partly overlapping periods and are not additive. Table 2 presents selected results from investigations and evaluations, with the limits on what they establish. [35-39]

Table 2. Findings from selected surveillance evaluations and investigations

Study and setting	Observed or modeled result	Interpretation
Overhage et al., Indiana	Electronic reporting found 4.4 times as many potential cases and identified them 7.9 days earlier than paper reporting. [6]	The gain depends on the prior reporting system.
Jackson et al., United States	Two listeriosis outbreaks solved in the year before sequencing, then five and nine in years one and two after introduction. [18]	Sequencing, interviews, and traceback contributed.
Peccia et al., New Haven	Sewage RNA led positive tests by 0 to 2 days by collection date and 6 to 8 days by report date. [24]	Apparent lead depended on the clinical time anchor.
Lim et al., Thailand	Lower culture use was modeled to raise third-generation cephalosporin resistance estimates for bloodstream *Escherichia coli* from 44% to 57%. [30]	Change in ascertainment, not evidence of increased transmission.
Campbell et al., England	Of 59 serogroup W cases, 32 involved strain A; 14 of those had a Saudi travel or household link. [38]	Related isolates were not limited to returning travelers.

4. Discussion

An earlier alert is useful only if the system can verify it and act in time. Evaluation should measure both the fraction of independently documented events that were detected and the fraction of reviewed alerts that led to a verified event. The first measure requires an event list that is not defined solely by the surveillance stream under evaluation. Report elapsed time separately for specimen collection to result, result to notification, and notification to verification or response. Medians can hide prolonged delays; upper percentiles and missing timestamps help expose bottlenecks. Comparing these measures across facilities can identify where investment in specimen referral, coding, investigation staff, or communication is more useful than a new detection model. [1, 6, 34]

A staged approach is feasible for routine and mass gathering surveillance. First agree on the minimum case and test fields, responsibilities for record linkage, and an escalation route. Audit coverage across referral hospitals and smaller facilities. Then add sequencing, wastewater, or targeted sampling where each stream has a defined decision it can inform. For pilgrimage-associated events, record dates and places of travel or healthcare exposure and arrange cross-jurisdictional follow-up using approved channels. Aggregated reporting can inform action while protecting individual identifiers. The Saudi examples support this workflow, but they do not establish the effectiveness of any one national system or justify transferring international lead-time estimates directly. [28, 31, 35, 37, 38]

This review draws on methodological and operational evidence across surveillance streams. Its narrative selection may omit eligible studies, and changes in test access, case definitions, and comparator performance limit generalization. Most studies measured case capture, signal timing, or clusters solved; fewer directly measured illnesses prevented. Prospective evaluation should document the action taken after an alert and assess whether adding a stream improves detection at a manageable review workload. [1, 11, 23, 34]

5. Conclusion

Population health surveillance is stronger when disease patterns are interpreted alongside testing volume, laboratory methods, and the timing of reports. Epidemiological investigation provides the exposure and population context needed to verify a laboratory signal. Sequencing, wastewater, and sentinel data can extend detection when their sampling limits are understood. A useful early warning system measures what happens from first signal through verification and response.

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